Budapest, June 5, 2026 – One of Hungary’s largest soft drink manufacturers restricted competition, according to findings by the Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH). Maspex Olympos Kft. (a Hungarian subsidiary of the Polish Maspex Group) imposed minimum prices for its products on its wholesale partners. As a result of this prohibited price-fixing, the Competition Council of the GVH imposed a fine of approximately HUF 336 million on the company, which cooperated with the Authority during the proceedings and acknowledged the violation.
The Hungarian Competition Authority launched a competition supervision proceeding at the end of 2022, beginning with a dawn raid, against one of the country’s largest soft drink manufacturers, Maspex Olympos Kft. (Maspex Kft.), which is the Hungarian distributor of brands such as Olympos, Kubu, Apenta, Figo, Topjoy, Nestea, and Tiger, as well as several alcoholic beverage brands.
The Hungarian subsidiary of the Polish Maspex Group came to the attention of the competition authority during a sectoral inquiry, which analysed the effects of discount schemes commonly used in beverage distribution and compliance with commercial regulations— including a review of certain beverage supply contracts. During this inquiry, the GVH noted that one of the major players had allegedly set minimum resale prices in its contracts with its partners for the products it distributed, thereby restricting price competition in the market.
The GVH found that Maspex Kft. stipulated in its contracts with its wholesale partners that they were required to adhere to the recommended minimum prices it had set for the alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages it manufactured or distributed. In addition, it regularly issued promotional price lists for non-alcoholic beverages and sent them to its partners, in which it also emphasized that they could not sell at prices lower than the recommended minimum prices listed therein, or, if they did apply a lower price, they should advertise it in their promotional flyers with catchphrases such as "TOP PRICE" or "BOMB PRICE" rather than listing the actual prices.
The Competition Council of the GVH determined that Maspex Kft. had committed a systematic, continuous infringement aimed at restricting competition, thereby violating both Hungarian and European legislation. During the proceedings, the company cooperated with the GVH and admitted to the infringement as part of a settlement procedure. Based on the foregoing, the Competition Council of the GVH imposed a fine of approximately HUF 336 million on the company, which is also required to maintain the compliance program it implemented following the initiation of the proceedings for an additional two years.
Resale price maintenance (also known as RPM) is an agreement between manufacturers and retailers in which the manufacturer sets a fixed or minimum retail price for its products. RPM restricts price competition among retailers, prevents stores from undercutting each other, and ultimately keeps prices artificially high for consumers. This practice constitutes a serious violation of competition law in both the European Union and Hungary. Restricting the retailers' freedom to set prices is unlawful even if it is "only" reflected in the contractual provisions, but no actual minimum prices are set in practice – as is the case with certain product categories in the present proceeding. Even such practices can serve to reduce the retailers' incentive to lower prices, either to avoid a potential breach of contract or because they can reasonably expect that their competitors will not lower prices either, due to similar contractual terms.
In connection with this case, additional competition supervision proceedings are also underway, involving not only Maspex Kft. but also domestic retail chains (Aldi, Auchan, CBA, Coop, Spar, Tesco).
The official registration number of the case is VJ/50/2022.
GVH Press
Further information:
Horváth Bálint, Head of Communications +36 20 238 6939